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Motivation
How does a student choose a school?
What is school quality? It is observed by a student but only imperfectly by an
econometrician
Governments publish school statistics but very few rankings
A Google search ’school ranking’ returns 4 million hits
Newspaper rankings are easily manipulated by schools, Avery et al (2005)
I present a ranking of school quality that pins down between two schools the one
that attracts high ability students at the lowest additional cost of quality
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Intuition of the model and results
I characterise schooling as a differentiated product market (Hotelling model)
I obtain an indicator that captures the substitutability among average quality of
schools and ability of students
I obtain the ranking by sorting the indicators by degree type, e.g. Economics, in
ascending order
The ranking says that the best school is the one making the least quality effort to
attract high ability students, i.e. the cheapest to finance ceteris paribus
The ranking that I compute using data on Italian college students differs from
available rankings
Other countries whose colleges have low fees and non-selective admission: Austria,
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and The Netherlands
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Schooling as a differentiated product market
Students with heterogeneous ability and geographic location demand schooling
Schools are firms that sell a single good, schooling, with 2 dimensions of differen-
tiation
• Horizontal: geographic location
• Vertical: desirability/quality
Equilibrium allocation of students across schools and quality
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Model: demand of student i for college j
uij = αj + βjai + γdij + δjaidij + τfj + ij (1)
xij = Pr(uij = max
k
uik)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pij=Pr(yi=j)
(2)
=
eαj+βjai+γdij+δjaidij+τfj∑
k e
αk+βkai+γdik+δkaidik+τfk
(3)
Utility uij depends on average quality αj of school j, student i’s ability ai, the
home-school distance dij and their interaction
The demand xij by student i is the probability that i chooses college j
Errors ij with a logistic distribution yield a multinomial logit model of school
choice with individual- and choice-invariant characteristics
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Illustration of demand by student i for school 1
xi1=Pr{yi=1}
1 1.5 2 Location (z)
1
xi1 | di1=0
1.251.125
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xi1 | di0=0.25
dxi1
dai
>0
dxi1
dai
<0 xi1
Demand xi1 for school 1 decreases with home-school distance (continuous line)
A change ∂xi1∂ai
in demand from a unit change in ability can be Q 0 (dashed line)
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Model: supply of school j
max
αj
piij = (fj − αj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
pj−cj
Pij︸︷︷︸
xij
(4)
pi′ij =
∂piij
∂αj
= −Pij + (fj − αj)Pij(1− Pij) = 0⇐⇒ (5)
α∗j = fj −
1
1− Pij(α∗j)
(6)
School j chooses average linear cost of quality c(αj) = αj to maximise profit piij
per student i
Fees fj are regulated and admission is not selective
A very low αj gives school j high profits but low probability that student i chooses
it and viceversa
α∗j is the implicit equilibrium condition of average school quality for school j
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Figure 1: Illustration: profit function and average quality of school j
The profit function pij is concave in average quality and α
∗
j is a global maximum
for reasonable parameter values
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Interpretation of equilibrium average quality α∗j
α∗j = fj −
1
1− P (α∗j , ai, dij, fj)
The greater the equilibrium average quality α∗j , the lower ability ai or home-school
distance dij and viceversa
An increase in α∗j (similar to inframarginal reasoning under monopoly) can make
high ability students ”switch” from school j into a different school
Ranking schools by αj or Pij would only capture the overall effect of average and
marginal quality
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Change in equilibrium quality as an indicator of school quality
α∗′ja =
∂α∗j
∂ai
= −
∂Pˆij
∂ai
∂Pˆij
∂αj︸︷︷︸
MQa
[
1 + α∗j(1− 2Pˆij)
]
[
1 + 1
α∗j
+ α∗j(1− 2Pˆij)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
AQ
α∗′ja says by how much school j has to change α
∗
j to change the average ability
of applicants by a unit
Sorting α∗′ja in ascending order ranks as top the school that spends the least in
quality to get high ability students, i.e. the cheapest to finance
The ranking can offer a back-of-the-envelope calculation of quality provision in
other services with regulated prices such as hospitals
10
Estimation method
I consider for example students in Economics in all colleges in Italy
I estimate
• the probability Pr(yi = j) that a student i chooses a degree in Economics in
college j
• a conditional logit model with individual- and choice-invariant characteristics
To identify αjs I use as a baseline category a synthetic college that I obtain by
drawing
• randomly from students in Economics
• a number of students equal to the mean size of a college in Economics
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Dataset of Italian college graduates (Source: Almalaurea)
Variable Mean Standard deviation Min Max
High school final grade 48.93 7.23 36 60
Male 0.47 0 1
Year of birth 1974 4 1923 1982
Graduation calendar year 2002 2 2000 2003
Home-college distance 159.33 245.58 0 1118.42
Pre-college geographic area of residence
North 0.57 0 1
Center 0.18 0 1
South 0.25 0 1
High school type
Gymnasium 0.565 0 1
Teaching 0.036 0 1
Languages 0.044 0 1
Technical 0.302 0 1
Vocational 0.029 0 1
Other 0.024 0 1
Mother’s education
No schooling 0.01 0 1
Primary school 0.209 0 1
Junior high school 0.271 0 1
High school 0.335 0 1
College degree 0.173 0 1
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Summary of results: Rank order correlation of rankings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
La Repubblica Equilibrium ranking Distance ranking Ability ranking
ranking Pˆj αˆ∗
′
d αˆ
∗′
a
La Repubblica ranking 1
Equilibrium ranking Pˆj 0.300 1
0.069
Distance ranking αˆ∗j 0.279 0.358 1
0.091 0.030
Ability ranking αˆ∗j -0.200 -0.142 0.100 1
0.229 0.398 0.559
The correlation between the
• the ranking that I propose in the bottom row and the one by the newspaper La
Repubblica are not statistically significant as the p-values in Italic font in the
table show
• equilibrium ranking and the ability or distance ones are not statistically signifi-
cant
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Results: Economics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
College Equilibrium Distance (d) Ability (a) Observations
ranking predicted ranking MFX ranking MFX
Pˆ LR value Pˆ αˆ∗′d LR αˆ∗
′
a LR
Bologna 1 1 0.165 6 1 -0.090* 9 1 0.004* 5462
(0.050) (0.003)
Torino 2 7 0.097 2 7 -0.052* 17 7 0.040 2876
(0.050) (0.051)
Messina 3 16 0.086 17 16 -0.048 16 16 -0.006 2855
(0.050) (0.008)
Parma 4 9 0.069 4 9 -0.045* 15 9 0.011* 2191
(0.027) (0.007)
Firenze 5 12 0.063 16 12 -0.039* 11 12 -0.003* 2040
(0.036) (0.003)
Bari 6 11 0.061 10 11 -0.036*** 8 11 -0.003* 2046
(0.004) (0.001)
Siena 7 5 0.058 8 5 -0.038* 7 5 -0.005* 1868
(0.023) (0.003)
Trento 8 2 0.054 1 2 -0.033* 19 2 0.015 1808
(0.033) (0.021)
Modena-Reggio Emilia 9 10 0.050 13 10 -0.033* 3 10 0.012* 1640
(0.024) (0.010)
Catania 10 14 0.047 12 14 -0.028 10 14 0.001* 1563
(0.040) (0.001)
Genova 11 3 0.043 11 3 -0.028* 12 3 -0.023 1310
(0.028) (0.028)
Chieti 12 15 0.042 3 15 -0.024 3 15 -0.002 1172
(0.039) (0.005)
Udine 13 13 0.028 14 13 -0.018 2 13 0.011 897
(0.026) (0.019)
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Results: Economics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
College Equilibrium Distance (d) Ability (a) Observations
ranking predicted ranking MFX ranking MFX
Pˆ LR value Pˆ αˆ∗′d LR αˆ∗
′
a LR
Bologna 1 1 0.165 6 1 -0.090* 9 1 0.004* 5462
(0.050) (0.003)
Torino 2 7 0.097 2 7 -0.052* 17 7 0.040 2876
(0.050) (0.051)
Messina 3 16 0.086 17 16 -0.048 16 16 -0.006 2855
(0.050) (0.008)
...
(0.033) (0.021)
Catania 10 14 0.047 12 14 -0.028 10 14 0.001* 1563
(0.040) (0.001)
...
Messina scores higher than Catania in the equilibrium ranking and viceversa in the
ability or distance ones
At the margin high ability students move out of Messina and to Catania
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Results: Engineering
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
College Equilibrium Distance (d) Ability (a) Observations
ranking predicted ranking MFX ranking MFX
Pˆ LR value Pˆ αˆ∗′d LR αˆ∗
′
a LR
Torino 1 1 0.224 4 1 -0.091* 14 1 -0.014* 5090
(0.054) (0.014)
Bologna 2 6 0.200 8 6 -0.107** 11 6 -0.001* 4811
(0.050) (0.001)
Padova 3 4 0.155 13 4 -0.074* 13 4 -0.002* 3405
(0.059) (0.002)
...
Vercelli 13 8 0.012 3 8 -0.009* 8 8 0.0003* 277
(0.009) (0.0003)
...
Torino scores higher than Vercelli in the equilibrium ranking and viceversa in the
ability or distance ones
In Engineering there are fewer departments than in other fields and the three top
departments have higher Pˆ values and lower MFX ones
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Results: Law
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
College Equilibrium Distance (d) Ability (a) Observations
ranking predicted ranking MFX ranking MFX
Pˆ LR value Pˆ αˆ∗′d LR αˆ∗
′
a LR
Bologna 1 2 0.168 10 2 -0.135* 14 2 -0.024* 6062
(0.086) (0.015)
Parma 2 10 0.093 18 10 -0.082* 12 10 -0.002* 3360
(0.070) (0.002)
Bari 3 3 0.089 5 3 -0.048 3 3 0.003 3201
(0.085) (0.007)
...
Genova 9 1 0.047 16 1 -0.025 18 1 -0.006 1686
(0.063) (0.016)
...
In Liguria Genova is the only college and has mid-ranking values of the equilibrium
ranking and bottom values of distance and ability ones
In Emilia Romagna there are 4 colleges and Bologna scores above in the equilibrium
ranking but below in the ability ranking
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Conclusions
The ranking offers a methodology to pin down best and worst schools by setting
apart average and marginal information contained in the students’ revealed prefer-
ences
Two preliminary policy recommendations:
• Use in the financing of schools indicators of quality capturing the
– preferences of students
– optimising behaviour of schools over financial resources
• Jointly use in ranking schools the
– equilibrium ranking as a measure of average quality
– ability ranking as marginal quality to differentially award different schools
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Extensions
Model
• Characterise the joint distribution of students’ ability and geographic location
• Use observed and unobserved information on school quality
• Obtain optimal weights of marginal and average college quality to inform policy
makers’ decisions
Estimation
•Mixed models free of IIA assumption
• I/O type of IV exploiting characteristics of neighbouring schools
• Panel dimension of college changes by students and survey data on quality
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